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Abstract: 
 
The aim of this article is to analyze the question of career interruptions and to evaluate their 
impact on pension retirement for French private sector workers. Using the last French survey 
on households’ wealth (2003-2004), we first study the career setbacks for individuals born 
between 1938 and 1948. We highlight the new trends in professional paths. The risk of 
unemployment and job flexibility has sharply risen. As a consequence, some cohorts appear to 
be more exposed to career interruptions. Second, we determine how pension rights for French 
employees are affected by different career accidents. We consider unemployment, part-time 
employment and inactivity periods. Our results show how, by compensating for some career 
accidents, the French legislation allows individuals to receive, in some cases, the same level 
of pension that they would have received with a smooth professional path.  
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Introduction 
The retirement age and the standard of living of pensioners depend on a variety of individual 
and familial life routes: age of employment entry, children, life expectancy, unemployment, 
inactivity... These deviations from a continuous career are more frequent than in the past in 
most OECD countries and could induce a strong impact on the age of retirement and on 
pension benefits (COR, 2007). The aim of this article is to evaluate the effects of several cases 
of career breaks on the retirement pension for French workers. 
The literature dealing with this subject highlights the specific situation of women. A lot of 
studies provide an analysis of women’s career interruptions due to childbirth. Arun et alii. 
(2004)  and Malo and Munoz-Bullon (2008) conduct this type of study respectively in the 
Australian and British cases. According to Arun et alii. (2004), women face income penalties 
because of their child-related career breaks. Malo and Munoz-Bullon (2008) show that 
women tend to choose lower-prestige occupations in anticipation of their career interruptions. 
Nakamura and Ueda (1999) investigate the determinants of career interruption following 
childbirth for married women in Japan. Their results show the difficulty for an educated 
woman to find an equivalent position when she quits her job due to childbirth. From Danish 
data, Gupta and Smith (2001) assess the negative impact of children on mothers’ human 
capital accumulation. In most cases, the number of children has a negative effect on women’s 
wages and consequently on women’s pensions.  
While children affect particularly women’s careers, others career break determinants could be 
identified. The literature on the French case (Briard, 2007; Cloarec, 2000; Colin, Iéhlé, and 
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Mahieu, 2000; Caussat, 1996) shows that many individuals are now affected by several breaks 
during their professional trajectory due to unemployment, early retirement, part-time work, or 
inactivity.  
Little research has been done to estimate the impact of these interruptions on pension benefits. 
We provide an analysis of the consequences of career accidents on pension retirement in the 
case of French employees. Their situations are quite relevant because, firstly, the last pension 
reform (2003) has introduced new rules on pension rights. Secondly, in France, workers 
acquire pension rights in some cases of career interruptions. Indeed, French legislation allows  
compensation of unemployment, illness or invalidity periods in terms of duration, but the 
amount of pension is often calculated from a smaller reference wage. Inactivity could be also 
compensated by allowing insurance periods but only in the case of children’s education.  
This article distinguishes two sets of analysis. On the one hand, this paper investigates the 
recent evolution of career accidents from microdata provided by a French survey (Enquête 
Patrimoine, Insee, 2003-2004). Our results indicate that workers and pensioners are 
experiencing very different economic situations. These disparities are strengthened by taking 
into account the generation, the gender or the socio-economic group. On the other hand, this 
paper investigates the impact of different career accidents (unemployment, part-time work...) 
on pensions by considering the last pension reform’s rules (2003).  
 
The plan of the article is as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of the recent literature on the 
evolution of the French professional trajectories. Section 3 describes the methodology of 
career reconstruction and presents career path analysis. Section 4 assesses the impact of career 
accidents on pension. A final section concludes. 
 
 3 
A brief literature review 
The recent literature on career interruptions indicates that smooth careers are not frequent. 
This phenomenon is particularly observed in France over the last years. Many French studies 
have devoted their attention to these increasing career breaks (Cloarec, 2000; Colin, Iélhé, and 
Mahieu, 2000; Burricand and Roth, 2000; Bommier, Magnac and Roger, 2003). Cloarec 
(2000) focuses on the transition time between the last working period and retirement. The 
author shows that today the breaks are more frequent at the end of career than in the past. 
Precisely, the results indicate that the time between the end of working life and the beginning 
of retirement increased from less than 1 year for people born before 1912, to 2.5 years for 
people born between 1932 and 1936.  
By using the same survey, Burricand and Roth (2000) pointed towards the crucial role of 
French legislation, notably, the possibility for workers in the private sector to retire earlier
6
. 
However Bommier, Magnac and Roger (2003) indicate that the activity rate
7
 remains stable 
for years. According to these authors, part-time work has developed over the last years for 
men and women. From data provided by the French Employment survey, they indicate that 
this phenomenon is observed more frequently for men aged from 55 to 59: between 1984 and 
1997, the proportion of individuals concerned by part-time employment has tripled.  
Magnac, Rapoport and Roger (2006) carry out a study on the end of careers. They examine 
the impact of an unemployment period, at the end of professional life, on retirement age. They 
take into account the effects of the last French reform in 2003 which increased the duration of 
contribution to receive a full pension. 
6
 1992 French agreement. 
7
 According to ILO. 
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Using a survey on retirees’ incomes
8
, wages data
9
, data on unemployment benefits and early 
retirement
10
, they study accumulated pension rights as well as career and retirement decisions. 
Their analysis shows that women retire later than men, as they experience more career 
interruptions.  
With a duration model, they analyze the impact of unemployment on retirement decisions. 
According to their results, workers have a higher probability to retire at the age of 60 and 65 if 
they experienced an unemployment period during their career.  
Colin and Mette (2003) focus their research on the impact of career setbacks on pension 
amounts for workers from the private sector by taking into account the 1993 French reform. 
They observed that both the break in the working career and the duration of working life have 
an impact on pension benefits. However, the evolution of the legislation shows that different 
generations are not submitted to the same treatment. Cohorts fully concerned by the reform of 
1993 benefit from a lower replacement rate. Workers experiencing a setback such as 
unemployment, part-time employment or inactivity often receive a lower replacement rate. 
This impact can be considerable in terms of pension amounts.  
In our article, we follow the same methodology used by Colin and Mette. Nevertheless, we 
evaluate the impact of career breaks on retirement pensions in the French case by taking into 
account the last pension reforms rules (2003) and more career breaks cases. Before evaluating 
the impact of career interruptions, we have to build the career path. 
 
Methodology of career reconstruction and Career Path Analysis 
Methodology 
8
 Data from the Échantillon Interrégimes des Retraités (EIR), a panel which gives information about a retiree’s 
pension in all pension schemes (private - régime general – public pension schemes and complementary 
schemes). 
9
 Annual wage returns data given by firms (DADS). 
10
 Data about the unemployment benefits and pre-retirement from the Union Nationale pour l’Emploi dans 
l’Industrie et le Commerce (UNEDIC) 
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 In order to reassemble the careers of individuals belonging to the 1938 to 1948 generations, 
the information given by the INSEE “Enquête Patrimoine” 2003-2004 (box 1) is very helpful 
to conduct an analysis by cohort as well as by gender. The role of gender is also analysed in 
detail. Two sub-groups are considered: 2105 men and 2068 women. This survey is 
particularly useful, as it encompasses a retrospective calendar of the individuals’ professional 
careers. Moreover, the database offers information about all pension schemes. The family 
characteristics are also provided (number of children)
11
. Starting with the initial situation of 
each individual, this calendar allows the reader to progressively trace the professional careers 
of the individual and to identify any interruptions in activity that may have taken place 
(unemployment and inactivity). The length of each employment can be found, even if the 
calendar depends on the memory of the surveyed individual. Indeed, some career setbacks 
may not be mentioned, either because the period was too short for the individual to remember, 
or because the period of unemployment or inactivity was perceived as a painful phase and 
therefore difficult to bring up. In other words, the survey minimises the number and the length 
of career setbacks. 
 
Box 1: The INSEE Patrimoine Survey 2003-2004 
The Patrimoine survey 2003-2004, including 9,692 households, was completed by INSEE 
between October 2003 and January 2004 and contains data on the entire metropolitan area. 
The objective was to evaluate the ownership and the value of different types of capital assets 
or liabilities, to describe the professional capital of self-employed workers to retrace the 
history (both conjugal and professional) behind the capital of the households (inheritance, 
professional activity cycle). 
11
 The Echantillon Interrégimes des Cotisants (EIC) is another French survey which gives detailed information 
on the insured, but children and unemployed without benefits are not recorded. 
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 It is the last survey available on this subject. It follows the survey on Financial Assets in 1992 
and the Patrimoine survey in 1998. 
 
The survey includes four questionnaires completed by French households and individuals. 
The survey covers 22,821 individuals (48% men and 52% women) aged 0 to 99 years old. All 
of these individuals are interviewed in the first questionnaire, the individual questionnaire. 
These individuals belong to the households interviewed in the second questionnaire. This 
second part of the survey characterizes the households’ behaviours. In this “Households” part 
of the survey, 9 692 households are interviewed. The third questionnaire, the ‘Product’ part of 
the survey, provides us with information on the savings and financial products as well as the 
capital holdings of the household. Finally, the last questionnaire, ‘Transmission’, refers to the 
different transfers of capital between ancestors and descendants.  
 
This survey particularly informs the reader of the financial and non-financial assets of the 
household belonging to the selected individual questioned, their revenue, their age, their 
social-professional category, their education/training, their marital situation, and their status 
(active, inactive, retired). Furthermore, the survey also includes the type (and sometimes the 
amount) of asset detention retained by the household (checking account, savings account, real 
estate, life insurance, corporate savings, etc...). Retirement pensions, both state and private 
(type and amount), are also presented.  
 
In addition, the survey reports on the situation of households faced with unemployment, 
illness, and financial constraints. Individuals are asked about their career, their different 
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occupations over their past professional path and their unemployment, part-time employment 
or inactivity periods.  
Another French survey, “l’échantillon interrégime des cotisants (EIC)”, regularly informs 
about the pension rights accumulated by the insured in different public pension schemes. 
However, we prefer the Patrimoine Survey because it allows us to combine the personal 
behaviours of the individuals with their household’s characteristics, something we cannot do 
using the EIC. Indeed, we cannot neglect the family phenomena when studying retirement 
planning. 
 
Initially, the surveyed individuals had the choice between 15 modalities. Given the 
complexity and the multitude of professional careers, a regrouping of the different 
occupations into 6 categories was established in the following manner: 
 
Category Grouping 
1 Study / Training / Apprenticeship / National 
Service 
2 Public sector  
3 Self-employed / entrepreneur / working in 
the spouse’s company 
4 Unemployed (short and long term) / 
searching for employment 
5 Retire / Early retirement / Out of business 
6  Inactive / housewife / in search or not of 
employment 
   Source: Categories produced by the authors based on the Patrimoine Survey 2003-2004, 
INSEE. 
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 For each cohort, an analysis of the individuals’ careers was performed, starting with their 
initial occupation and followed by a decomposition of their different occupational 
movements. 
 
Career Path Analysis 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present the prominent results obtained for the men and women belonging to 
the 1938 to 1948 generations. 
The results indicate that career setbacks are becoming more frequent, particularly for people 
born after 1944; this is the case for women as much as for men. 
 
As time passes by, men experiencing careers without setbacks before the age of 55 are rarer 
(table 1). These men represented 91% of the 1938 generation and 80% of the 1943 generation. 
 
Increasing periods of unemployment and inactivity are also observed. More and more men are 
experiencing at least one period of unemployment during their career path (7% for the 1938 
generation, 14% for the 1943 generation and 12% for the 1948 generation).  
Inactivity periods are also more and more frequent.  
No man from the 1938 and 1943 generations declared having known multiple unemployment 
periods, while 1.4% of the men from the 1948 generation claimed having been inactive 
multiple times throughout their professional career.    
 
 
 
Table 1: Evolution of Career Setbacks for Men before they are 55 years old 
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Generation 1938 1943 1948 
% of individuals without any career setbacks at 55 
years old  
Among them, without changes 
91% 
 
36% 
80.4% 
 
45% 
83% 
 
33.3% 
% of individuals having known at least one period of 
unemployment 
Among them, % of individuals having known: 
-unemployment in the beginning/middle of their career 
-unemployment at the end of career 
Multiple periods of unemployment 
7.1% 
 
 
62.5% 
37.5% 
1% 
14.7% 
 
 
33% 
67% 
2% 
12.2% 
 
 
44% 
56% 
3.4% 
% of individuals having known at least one period of 
inactivity 
Among them, % of individuals having known: 
-inactivity in the beginning/middle of their career 
-inactivity at the end of career 
Multiple periods of inactivity 
1.8% 
 
 
50% 
50% 
0% 
8.8% 
 
 
33.3% 
66.6% 
0% 
6.1% 
 
 
55% 
45% 
1.4% 
% of individuals having known one or more periods 
of unemployment and inactivity 
0% 2% 2% 
Number of observations 113 102 148 
Source: Patrimoine Survey 2003 -2004, authors’ calculations. 
 
For women, a decrease in the periods of inactivity (table 2) was observed. Fewer and fewer 
women experience multiple periods of inactivity during their career. As a result, women from 
more recent generations are more present on the labour market and therefore experience more 
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unemployment periods than their elders (17% for the 1943 generation, 17.5% for the 1948 
generation versus 13% for the 1938 generation). 
Table 2: Evolution of Career Setbacks for Women before they are 55 years old 
 
Generation 1938 1943 1948 
% of individuals without any career setbacks at 55 
years old  
Among them, without changes 
37.9% 
 
47% 
42.2% 
 
65% 
44.7% 
 
47% 
% of individuals having known at least one period of 
unemployment 
Among them, % of individuals having known: 
-unemployment in the beginning/middle of their career 
-unemployment at the end of career 
Multiple periods of unemployment 
12.7% 
 
 
58% 
42% 
4.2% 
17.2% 
 
 
25% 
75% 
3.5% 
17.4% 
 
 
50% 
50% 
3.7% 
% of individuals having known at least one period of 
inactivity 
Among them, % of individuals having known: 
-inactivity in the beginning/middle of their career 
-inactivity at the end of career 
Multiple periods of inactivity 
55.8% 
 
 
55% 
45% 
16.8% 
51.7% 
 
 
45% 
55% 
11.2% 
45.3% 
 
 
63% 
37% 
6.8% 
% of individuals having known one or more periods 
of unemployment and inactivity 
6% 11.2% 8% 
Number of observations 95 116 161 
Source: Patrimoine Survey 2003 -2004, authors’ calculations. 
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The career path of a woman appears to be less and less perturbed over time. A career without 
any interruptions is observed for 38% of the women from the 1938 generation, 42% from the 
1943 generation, and 45% from the 1948 generation.  
 
Impact of career accidents on pensions 
 
In this part, we propose to assess the impact of fluctuations around the standard career path on 
the pension amount and the replacement rate, which is the simplest and most used indicator of 
the link between pensions and wages. To do that, we use the sample cases method (Box 2) 
and define sample cases of a private sector worker’s career path which deviates from a full-
time continuous career because of unemployment, part-time work or inactivity.  
 
We limit our study to people who receive a basic pension from only the old age fund of the 
French Social Security, called CNAV (Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse). However, we 
assess the total amount of the pension determined at retirement, which includes the 
complementary pensions of ARRCO and AGIRC (only white collar workers). 
 
Box 2: The sample cases method 
 
“Sample cases” or “typical cases” are often used for the assessment of public policies. They 
refer to units like individuals or households, whose characteristics are entirely specified for 
the study carried out. With regard to existing situations, which would be extracted from a 
population, sample cases have the advantage of being simple and not being soiled by 
disruptive singular attributes.  
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For the study of pension rights, the sample case can represent an insured individual or even a 
couple or a household if the analysis is extended to survivors’ benefits. This sample of 
insured is then characterized by the attributes examined by the pension scheme for the 
calculation of one’s pension rights: year of birth, sex, number of children, wages, etc... 
The sample case can be typical or atypical, representative and\or illustrative. If the goal of 
the study is to approach a description of reality, sample cases are generally chosen as 
representative of the most frequent individual situations. This method collides with the 
problem that an average situation is not always representative of all of the individual 
situations which it is supposed to describe. Nevertheless, new developments based on the 
classification of longitudinal professional courses allow us to identify weighted typical cases 
from a whole population (Briard, 2007).  
If the goal of the sample cases is simply to illustrate the consequences of the pension’s 
calculation rules, the sample cases can be fictitious, only illustrative, without a narrow link to 
the characteristics of the population. The stylised sample cases used in this paper, partly built 
on statistics, can be assigned to an intermediate approach, between representative and 
conventional cases.  
 
 
 
Definitions and sample cases 
 
The reference case that we consider is the path of a childless individual who begins to work at 
the age of 20 and stops at 60 after a continuous career without breaks or reduced activity 
periods. It corresponds to the norm on which the calculation of the pension paid by the Social 
security plan is based (see Box 3). 
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 Five deviations around this reference case are considered
12
: 
- a part-time job, between the ages of 30 and 44; 
- an unemployment period spread over the career path: two years between the 9th and 
the 11
th
 year of the working life, two years between the 19
th
 and the 21
st
, one year 
between the 29
th
 and the 30
th
; 
- five years of early retirement, which can be assimilated to five years of unemployment 
at the end of the active life; 
- an inactivity period between 35 and 39 years to raise two children, associated to “old 
age insurance for parents living at home” (OIPH, see Box 3); 
- an inactivity period between 35 and 39 years to rise two children, but not associated to 
OIPH. 
Except these last two sample cases supposed to be those of women with two children, cases 
indifferently characterize a childless woman or a man.  
Our analysis also takes into account professional paths with both unemployment and 
inactivity. We specify three durations for the unemployment spells, 1 year, 3 years and 5 
years, and two durations of inactivity, 3 years and 5 years. The place of these events on the 
career is the following:  
- 1 year of unemployment at the age of 39 (20th year of the working life); 
- 3 years of unemployment: one at the age of 29, two years at the ages of 38 and 40; 
- 5 years of unemployment: same repartition as the second sample case; 
- 3 years of inactivity from the age of 31 to 33 years; 
- 5 years of inactivity from the ages of 31 to 35 years. 
12
 These five cases are those of Colin and Mette (2003). They are convergent with the observations made on the 
Patrimoine survey. 
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The professional paths with five years of inactivity are supposed to be followed by women 
with two children.  
 
Three earnings profiles are considered:  
- the flat profile of a blue collar worker 1.2 times the Guaranteed Minimum Wage 
(GMW);  
- the growing profile of a blue collar worker which starts at 0.5 times the SS wage-
ceiling (SSWC)
13
 and finishes at 1 SSWC after 40 years of activity; 
- the growing profile of a white collar worker (with contribution to AGIRC) which 
starts at 1 SSWC and finishes at 2 SSWC.  
To simplify, we assume that the earnings progress is linear and not concave as it is generally 
observed. Besides, only the path with inactivity leads to a temporary stop of the wages 
progress. In the other cases, after the interruption of activity, the wage is the same as in the 
absence of interruption. For the projection, the GMW and the social security wage ceiling are 
supposed to grow at an annual rhythm of 1.7% until 2010 and 1.8% beyond (except inflation). 
The rate of payroll contributions is constant in the projections. The retirement age is supposed 
to remain at 65, so that the pensions are always computed at the full rate, without penalties. 
 
 
Box 3: Calculation of the Social security pension  
Social security pensions are managed by the French national old age insurance fund. 
In 2008, the pension was calculated in reference to a continuous forty-year career path paid 
at the level of 800 hours of Guaranteed Minimum Wage (GMW) per year. Thus, a quarter of 
insurance is validated for every slice of annual wage at 200 hours of GMW (1,772 € on 
13
 The Social security ceiling is the maximal wage submitted to contribution for the basic pension scheme. It is 
indexed on wages’ growth. On January 1st, 2010, the annual ceiling was 34,620€. 
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January 1
st
, 2010). This validation does not take into account the actual duration of activity, 
so an individual having worked at this rate a single hour a year for forty years validates forty 
years of contribution. 
Some non-working periods validate quarters without contributory counterpart. These so 
called “assimilated periods” or AP are granted for any period of 50 days of unemployment, 
60 daily allowances in case of disease (also in case of childbirth or of occupational accident) 
and for any quarterly payment of the invalidity pension. 
 
The Social security pension is the product of three terms, in a nutshell: 
- the annual average wage (AAW), calculated as the average of the actualized highest 
annual wages (the 17 highest for the 1940-generation, the 25 highest for the 1948-
generation); 
- the prorate coefficient, which is the ratio between the insurance period validated by 
the individual at the Social security scheme, pSS, and the statutory maximal insurance 
period, PSS (150 quarters for the 1940-generation until 2008, 160 since); 
- the calculation rate (τ), called “full rate” at its maximum of 50% and reduced by a 
rate δ according to the insurance period required to reach 65 years of age or a 
statutory insurance period, all basic plans being considered, PAP (157 quarters for the 
1940-generation until 2003, 160 since). 
 
At retirement, the basic amount of the pension benefit B is calculated as:  
τ×× ),1( min
SS
SS
P
p
AAW    
with  [ ]),0max(),65(4min%50 APAP pPage −−××−= δτ  
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For people who are eligible for the full rate, this amount is compared to a minimal amount 
called “contributory minimum”, which is delivered on the prorata of the contribution period 
validated at the CNAV. On April 1
st
 2010, its complete annual amount (when pSS ≥ PSS) is 
7,147.68€. 
The complete and full pension is a reference, but is not an average. It rather constitutes an 
eligible maximum because an insured individual whose career path is longer cannot expect a 
higher pension or an earlier retirement, except if he benefits from two conditions introduced 
in 2003: - a “surcote”, which increases the pension of a rate up to 5% on the condition of 
pursuing a salaried activity after 60 and being eligible for the full rate; - an early retirement, 
starting at age 56 for the insured having long careers (with conditions of total insurance 
period, contribution duration and age of the beginning of activity). 
Consequently, among the main differences with regard to the continuous career path, we can 
mention: the losses of rights due to periods of interrupted or reduced activity, and early 
retirements before eligibility for the full rate with an insufficient contribution duration.  
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Box 4: Taking the career accidents into account 
in the pension of the private sector employees 
 
Unemployment periods 
CNAV compensates unemployment in terms of insurance period by granting 1 quarter for 50 
days of allowances. If the unemployment period isn’t compensated by the unemployment 
fund, it is taken into account by the pension scheme within the limits of one year (continuous 
period or not) and, from the 2
nd 
period, on the condition of succeeding to a compensated 
unemployment period. 
In the complementary plans ARRCO and AGIRC, the unemployment periods allow the 
granting of points on the basis of the last wages: the daily wage determines the amount of 
unemployment allowances for ARRCO, and the three last years define allowances for 
AGIRC. 
Consequently, periods of unemployment are quite well compensated by basic and 
complementary plans. However, the pension of an insured person having known 
unemployment periods could be lower than if he had followed a continuous career path if:  
- more than one year of unemployment isn’t compensated by the unemployment fund; 
- the number of days of the unemployment period was lower than 50 in a calendar year; 
- wages earned during the years where he was unemployed are included in the annual 
average wage (AAW); this is often the case if the working life is shorter than 25 years. 
 
Inactivity periods 
CNAV gives place to compensation of inactivity periods only in the case of parental leave: a 
rise of the insurance period is granted to men and women, but they can’t cumulate it with the 
insurance period bonus of eight quarters per child, which is automatically granted to 
 18 
women
14
. Low-income and children’s age conditions (one child under 3 years of age or three 
children under 21), reduced activity or inactivity periods can also give the right to the 
pension of the “old age insurance for parents living at home” (OIPH), which consists in 
granting wages (based on GMW) and quarters. 
These familial rights are granted without the obligation of stopping activity, and they are 
cumulative.  
For ARRCO and AGIRC, periods of inactivity give points during parental leave if 
contributions are paid (with the agreement of the employer), but there is no OIPH. In general, 
there is no compensation for the interruption of working life due to the children’s education, 
but a pension bonus is given to parents of three or more children.  
 
Part-time and low wages 
For the CNAV, only the highest wages count for the calculation of the AAW.  
A quarter is validated from 200 hours of the Guaranteed Minimum Wage (GMW), that is to 
say four quarters for a half-time at the GMW all year long or a full-time at the GMW for six 
months. The important number of wages counted for the AAW penalizes the insured with 
short and\or intermittent career paths. Since 2004, when no quarter is validated, the 
corresponding year is excluded. However, if a single quarter is validated, the wage –though 
lower— is considered an annual wage. 
ARRCO and AGIRC don’t compensate periods of weak payments because the points to 
which the workers are entitled are in proportion to their contributions. Since 2005, people 
have the possibility of paying the contribution on the basis of full-time employment, but in 
accordance with their employers.  
 
14
 The bonus of eight quarters by child was reformed in 2010. Now, four out of eight quarters can be given the 
father according the decision of the parents. 
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Results and analysis  
 
At retirement, former employees of the private sector receive at least two pensions from the 
statutory plans: the pension benefit of the Social security, which is a function of the insurance 
period and the best wages, and the pension of the complementary plans, ARRCO and AGIRC 
for white collar workers, which are proportional to contributions. Yet, each of these schemes 
includes some compensation mechanisms so that an “accident” in the career path is generally 
smoothened.  
 
Impact on the Social security pension paid by CNAV 
For the sample cases considered for the 1940-generation, part-time employment, 
unemployment and inactivity, associated or not with the OIPH, induce a variation up to 12% 
on the CNAV pension amount (Table 3 and Annex 1).  
The impact of an accident on the insurance period is limited by various mechanisms included 
in the legislation (see. Box 4). The insurance period is of 160 quarters for the sample case 
with part-time employment because the annual wage is supposed to be always higher than 800 
hours of GMW. For the case with unemployment periods, wages earned during years without 
unemployment are sufficient to validate four quarters a year too; moreover, the years for 
which the unemployment period lasts all year are completely compensated with the validation 
of four assimilated periods (AP). We observe the same result for the cases with an early 
retirement or an inactivity period associated to OIPH. The only cases in which the insurance 
period is less than that of the continuous career are the sample cases with inactivity and no 
OIPH. Of course, losses in the insurance period are less when a bonus is granted for children 
(16 quarters for two children). For example, the insurance period of the case with 5 years of 
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unemployment and 3 years of inactivity is only 148 quarters, while it is 156 for the case of 5 
years of unemployment and 5 years of inactivity with two children (Annex 1b). 
 
Whatever the sample case, the wages are superior or equal to 1.2 GMW so that the pension is 
not raised at the contributory minimum and the annual average wage (AAW) is effectively 
taken into account for the calculation of the pension. As a consequence, the incidence of a 
not-salaried period is variable according its timing in the career and the wages profile: if it 
concerns a period of weak (respectively high) earnings, AAW -and consequently the pension 
benefit- will be higher (respectively lesser) than for a continuous career path. Thus, a period 
of unemployment generally affects AAW and pension benefits less than an early retirement 
period, which is situated at the end of active life. For the sample cases studied, early 
retirement causes a decline reaching about 13% for a career path with wages growing from 
0.5 to 1 SSWC, 6% for a flat profile with wages at 1.2 GMW and 5% for wages going up to 
the ceiling (cf. table 3a), while these values are always less in case of an unemployment 
period with the same duration: respectively -2.1%, -1.0% and -0.4%. 
Besides, in case of an accident (part-time, unemployment or inactivity), the selection of the 
highest wages limits the decline of the AAW and, as a consequence, the pension. For 
example, for a career paid 1.2 GMW, the period of part-time employment induces a loss of 
18.5% of the career average wage for the 1940-generation, but AAW being calculated on only 
the best wages (the 17 highest ones), its decline remains weak (in most cases 0.4%; cf. table 3 
and Annex 1a). The “shock absorber” role of the calculation rule of the AAW is also 
particularly visible on the case mixing unemployment and inactivity breaks (Table 3b and 
Annex 1b). In particular, when we consider ten years without wages, that is one quarter of the 
total career duration, the AAW only declines 0.4% in the sample case with the higher wages 
(1 to 2 SSW) when the career average wage declines about 4%.  
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 For the more recent generations, the increasing number of wages included in the AAW 
(enacted in 1993) leads to a decline of the ratio AAW / career average wage (Table 4). This 
weakens the “shock absorber” mechanism, particularly for the increasing proportion of people 
for whom the working life is shorter than the number of wages considered in AAW. The risk 
of a decrease in pensions is strengthened by the gradual increase in the insurance period 
required to benefit from a full pension (enacted by the 1993 and 2003 reforms) and to have a 
complete pension (2003 reform). As a consequence, the standard career of forty years 
becomes incomplete and does not represent the norm anymore. The relative losses due to a 
deviation from the new standard career could also increase.  
 
Impact on the total amount of the pension  
The complementary plans are often qualified as more contributive than the basic plan because 
they do not include implicit redistributive mechanisms such as the AAW calculation rules. 
Neverthess, they compensate some accidents like unemployment periods to a wider extent by 
granting as many points as the wage was maintained, while the basic plan validates quarters 
but does not record wages, which can have a negative impact on the annual average wage.  
Evidence of redistributive mechanisms in the pension calculation rules, specifically in the 
basic pension, is given by decreasing replacement rates: the higher the wages during the 
working life, the stronger the erosion in purchasing power at retirement. In the sample cases 
under consideration, redistribution essentially plays between the low or the average level of 
earnings (1.2 GMW or 0.5 to 1 SSCW) and the high level of earnings (1 to 2 SSCW), 
regardless of the replacement rates computed on the last wage (see Figure 1) or on the average 
wage (see Table 3 and Annex 1).  
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 The total effect of a deviation from the standard career path on the total amount of pension 
depends on the nature of the deviation.  
The differences in wages –due to part-time employment, for example– are not smoothened in 
the complementary pensions. As expected, with regard to other accidents, the insured who 
have part-time employment periods are those who lose most in terms of complementary 
pension, and the higher their wages, the higher their losses: the loss reaches 12.4% for the 
career at 1.2 GMW, 13.1% for the career growing from 0.5 to 1 SSWC, and of 19.3 % for the 
career growing from 1 to 2 SSWC, with a 30% loss on the only pension served by the 
AGIRC.  
On the contrary, in the case of unemployment, the complementary plans can better 
compensate the loss in pension. It appears that the loss in complementary pensions is less in 
the case of early retirement –assimilated to unemployment for the pension entitlements– than 
in the case of unemployment earlier in the career. With regard to a continuous career, the loss 
of total pension in the case of early retirement is less important than on only the basic plan 
(2.5% versus 5.9% for a career at 1.2 GMW, for example; see Table 3). On the other hand, the 
compensation of unemployment at younger ages by the complementary plans is not sufficient 
to compensate for the negative consequences of the accident on the total pension (1.9% versus 
1.0% for a career in 1.2 GMW). 
In no case do complementary plans compensate inactivity. Thus, the complementary pension 
of an insured having interrupted his activity is always lower than the pension of an insured 
with a continuous career. Nevertheless, for the sample cases considered in which inactivity is 
connected to the education of children, the familial rights entitled by the basic scheme, which 
can “overcompensate” this kind of interruption, perform quite well for the complete 
compensation of blue collar workers and reduce the decline of the pension for the white collar 
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workers. In particular, the familial rights can help to access to the « surcote », i.e. a bonus of 
the pension for each quarter validated by contribution after the full-rate age, from 60. 
Consequently, a woman with 160 quarters at 60 (got by 31 years of work, 5 years of OIPH, 
plus 4 years for two children) who works during four years from 60 to 63, can get a bonus of 
12% on her basic pension if the bonus rate is of 3% per annum
15
. 
15
 The bonus rate was 3% by year until 2006. It became progressive, from 3% to 5% according the number of 
contributed quarters, in 2007 and 2008. From January, 1
st
, 2009, it is uniform and set at 5%. 
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 Conclusion 
 
This article provides a measure of the impact of several career breaks on the pension 
retirement taking into account the last French pension reform (2003). The statutory pension 
schemes of the private sector employees include mechanisms to compensate career setbacks. 
However, the mechanisms could be estimated insufficient in the extent that the insured are not 
guaranteed to perceive the amounts they would have earned if they had continued to work. 
In the theoretical cases studied and under the assumptions relative to these cases, a break in 
career could appear to be an advantage for the insured, who may perceive the same -even a 
higher- pension than he would with a continuous career. Nevertheless, the situation for which 
the pensioner receives a higher pension amount when the career is interrupted is only 
observed in the specific case of inactivity for children’s education. This overcompensation is 
not necessarily inefficient, as it not only compensates for the direct consequences of the 
accident, but also the long run repercussions on the career. It’s notably the case with 
childbirth because mothers obliged to temporally interrupt their activities can have difficulties 
recovering the same level of wages, or a similar growth in wages, when they are back on the 
labour market.  
Besides, we have to keep in mind these evaluations are carried out on specific cases. Most of 
the career accidents lasted entire years –except for the case with unemployment spread over 
the career path. This has a relatively low impact on the annual average wage because in 
counterpart, the years with wages included in the pension are not amputated.  
 
Among the various measures authorities could take to correct the negative consequences of 
career setbacks on pension, one measure could be to record the wages which would have been 
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perceived without the career break. An easier to implement and less expansive measure would 
be to consider the allowances perceived during the career break, as it is currently 
contemplated for maternity leave. However, this solution would not systematically give a 
higher pension in the extent that no wage can be less penalizing on the annual average wage 
than a low wage (including allowances) for persons who have fully worked during less than 
25 years. If we lay cost issues aside, these kinds of measures could be considered for career 
setbacks such as unemployment or illness where the allowances are linked to contributions. In 
return, even if it’s also technically possible that in a similar way the social income given to 
inactive people provide pension rights, that would raise questions about the grounds and the 
goals of the pension system. Finally, if we search to minimize the impact of career setbacks 
on retirees’ revenues, the analysis scope has to be broadened in order to envision other 
calculation rules and to consider the social protection system as a whole.  
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Table 3: Deviations from the reference career  
a) Analysis on sample cases with one kind of accident – 1940-generation – retirement at 65 years 
continuous, full-time 11 885      15 617     160         7 808      65,7% 12 753    107,3% 12 753     107,3%
with part-time -18,5% -0,4% 0,0% -0,4% 14,52 -5,1% 17,60 -5,1% 17,60
with unemployment -7,2% -1,0% 0,0% -1,0% 4,44 -1,9% 6,21 -1,9% 6,21
with early retirement -5,9% -5,9% 0,0% -5,9% -0,01 -2,5% 3,87 -2,5% 3,87
inactivity compensated by OIPH -0,3% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 0,17 0,3% 0,58 0,3% 0,58
     (with activity after 60)** -0,3% 0,0% 10,0% 12,0% 8,07 7,6% 8,48 7,6% 8,48
inactivity not compensated -0,3% 0,0% -2,5% 0,0% 0,17 0,3% 0,58 0,3% 0,58
continuous, full-time 17 721      25 157     160         12 579    71,0% 19 045    107,5% 19 045     107,5%
with part-time -17,0% -2,1% 0,0% -2,1% 12,72 -5,9% 14,45 -5,9% 14,45
with unemployment -6,6% -2,1% 0,0% -2,1% 3,43 -2,7% 4,46 -2,7% 4,46
with early retirement -9,3% -12,8% 0,0% -12,8% -2,73 -8,7% 0,65 -8,7% 0,65
inactivity compensated by OIPH 1,3% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% -0,93 0,2% -1,20 0,2% -1,20
     (with activity after 60)** 1,3% 0,0% 10,0% 12,0% 7,48 8,1% 7,21 8,1% 7,21
inactivity not compensated 1,3% 0,0% -2,5% 0,0% -0,93 0,2% -1,20 0,2% -1,20
continuous, full-time 35 443      27 589     160         13 794    38,9% 21 636    61,0% 30 117     85,0%
with part-time -17,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 7,98 -2,7% 10,53 -10,4% 6,72
with unemployment -6,6% -0,4% 0,0% -0,4% 2,58 -0,8% 3,79 -4,3% 2,15
with early retirement -9,3% -4,8% 0,0% -4,8% 1,92 -2,4% 4,59 -6,2% 2,85
inactivity compensated by OIPH 1,3% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% -0,51 -0,2% -0,94 -2,8% -3,50
     (with activity after 60)** 1,3% 0,0% 10,0% 12,0% 4,10 7,4% 3,67 2,6% 1,11
inactivity not compensated 1,3% 0,0% -2,5% 0,0% -0,51 -0,2% -0,94 -2,8% -3,50
Replacem
ent
rate
Pension in 
€2007 
Replacem
ent
rate
CNAV + ARRCO + AGIRC
Pension in 
€2007 
Pension in 
€2007 
Replacem
ent
rate
Total 
insurance 
period
CNAV CNAV + ARRCO
from 0.5 to 1 
SSWC
(blue collar)
from 1 to 2 
SSWC
(white collar)
AAW 
in €2007
1.2 GMW
(blue collar)
Career 
average 
wage
in €2007
 
SSWC: Social security wage ceiling, * Gross replacement rate of the career average wage (deviation in points of percentage) 
** Case with a labor withdrawal at 56, then a re-entry from 60 to 63. The insurance period is unchanged, but the insured is eligible to a bonus of her basic pension. For the 1940-generation, the 
case has an illustrative role, because the “surcote” was set up in 2004 and only the quarters got from this date are taken into account. Moreover, here we suppose the delay of the working period 
from 56-59 to 60-63 has no impact on the pension without bonus (actualization coefficients of wages and points prices are the same). 
Amounts in euros 2007, the career annual average wage of an insured born in 1940 who has followed a continuous career from 20 to 59 years of age, paid at full-time at 1.2 GMW, is of 
11,885 €. At his retirement at 65, this insured can expect from the CNAV a pension of 7,808 €, his replacement rate is then of 65.7% (7,808 / 11,885). If this insured had had 15 years of part-
time from 30 to 44 years, his pension would have been less of 0.4% and his replacement rate higher of 14.52 points. 
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b) Analysis on sample cases with two kinds of accidents – 1940-generation – retirement at 65 years 
continuous, full-time 11 885        15 617     160         7 808      65,7% 12 753    107,3% 12 753       107,3%
1 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 1,7% 0,0% -7,5% -1,3% -1,99 -2,1% -4,10 -2,1% -4,10
1 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 2,3% 0,0% -2,5% 0,0% -1,50 1,1% -1,33 1,1% -1,33
3 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. -0,3% 0,0% -7,5% -1,3% -0,65 -2,4% -2,18 -2,4% -2,18
3 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 0,1% 0,0% -2,5% 0,0% -0,09 0,8% 0,76 0,8% 0,76
5 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. -5,9% -1,0% -7,5% -2,3% 2,49 -4,3% 1,78 -4,3% 1,78
5 y. unempl., 5 y. inact.+ 2 child. -5,7% -1,0% -2,5% -1,0% 3,30 -1,2% 5,10 -1,2% 5,10
continuous, full-time 17 721        25 157     160         12 579    71,0% 19 045    107,5% 19 045       107,5%
1 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 2,4% 0,0% -7,5% -1,3% -2,57 -2,2% -4,77 -2,2% -4,77
1 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 3,6% 0,0% -2,5% 0,0% -2,47 0,8% -2,94 0,8% -2,94
3 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 0,7% 0,0% -7,5% -1,3% -1,46 -2,4% -3,38 -2,4% -3,38
3 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 1,9% 0,0% -2,5% 0,0% -1,33 0,5% -1,47 0,5% -1,47
5 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. -4,8% -2,1% -7,5% -3,4% 1,03 -5,1% -0,37 -5,1% -0,37
5 y. unempl., 5 y. inact.+ 2 child. -4,0% -2,1% -2,5% -2,1% 1,37 -2,4% 1,82 -2,4% 1,82
continuous, full-time 35 443        27 589     160         13 794    38,9% 21 636    61,0% 30 117       85,0%
1 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 2,4% 0,0% -7,5% -1,3% -1,41 -2,7% -3,00 -2,9% -4,41
1 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 3,6% 0,0% -2,5% 0,0% -1,35 0,2% -2,02 -1,9% -4,50
3 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 0,7% 0,0% -7,5% -1,3% -0,80 -2,7% -2,11 -3,9% -3,91
3 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 1,9% 0,0% -2,5% 0,0% -0,73 0,1% -1,09 -2,8% -3,95
5 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. -4,8% -0,4% -7,5% -1,8% 1,25 -3,7% 0,73 -7,4% -2,33
5 y. unempl., 5 y. inact.+ 2 child. -4,0% -0,4% -2,5% -0,4% 1,44 -0,9% 1,95 -6,4% -2,15
Replac-
ement 
rate
Pension 
in €2007 
Replac-
ement 
rate
CNAV + ARRCO + AGIRC
Pension 
in €2007 
Pension 
in €2007 
Replac-
ement 
rate
Total 
insurance 
period
(quarters)
CNAV CNAV + ARRCO
from 0.5 to 1 
SSWC
(blue collar)
from 1 to 2 
SSWC
(white collar)
AAW 
in €2007
1.2 GMW
(blue collar)
Career 
average 
wage
in €2007
 
SSWC: Social security wage ceiling, * Gross replacement rate of the career average wage (deviation in points of percentage) 
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Table 4: Ratio AAW / gross annual wage average (retirement at 65) 
Career at 1.2 GMW 
(blue collar) 
Generations 
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 
Continuous at full-time 1.31 1.13 1.11 1.13 1.13 
with part-time 1.60 1.29 1.26 1.26 1.26 
with unemployment 1.40 1.19 1.16 1.17 1.26 
with early retirement 1.31 1.10 1.07 1.08 1.09 
inactivity compensated by OIPH 1.32 1.12 1.09 1.10 1.10 
inactivity not compensated 1.32 1.12 1.09 1.10 1.10 
For an insured born in 1940, the annual average wage (AAW) considered for the calculation of his pension is based on his 17 highest 
actualized wages. Because of the limitation to the best wage, if the insured has followed a continuous full-time carrier, with wages at 1.2 
GMW, the AAW is also higher than 31% of the gross annual wage average. From the 1948 generation, the number of wages considered in the 
AAW goes to 25, which leads to a decrease of the ratio AAW / gross annual wage average. The variations between the successive generations 
submitted to the same rules of calculation (here the 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 generations) are only due to different wage sequences. 
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Figure 1: Gross replacement rate of the last wage (retirement at 65 years) 
* Analysis on sample cases with only one kind of accident – 1940-generation 
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* For the case with early retirement, the last wage is the wage earned at 54 years and not at 59.  
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Annex 1: Evaluation on sample cases for the 1940-generation 
 
a) with only one kind of accident: part-time, unemployment, early retirement, inactivity with children 
continuous, full-time 11 885   15 617     160         7 808      65,7% 12 753    107,3% 12 753     107,3%
with part-time 9 690     15 547     160         7 773      80,2% 12 102    124,9% 12 102     124,9%
with unemployment 11 024   15 464     160         7 732      70,1% 12 514    113,5% 12 514     113,5%
with early retirement 11 186   14 695     160         7 348      65,7% 12 436    111,2% 12 436     111,2%
inactivity compensated by OIPH 11 855   15 617     176         7 808      65,9% 12 789    107,9% 12 789     107,9%
     (with activity after 60)** 11 855  15 617    176         8 745      73,8% 13 726    115,8% 13 726    115,8%
inactivity not compensated 11 855   15 617     156         7 808      65,9% 12 789    107,9% 12 789     107,9%
continuous, full-time 17 721   25 157     160         12 579    71,0% 19 045    107,5% 19 045     107,5%
with part-time 14 707   24 618     160         12 309    83,7% 17 930    121,9% 17 930     121,9%
with unemployment 16 547   24 624     160         12 312    74,4% 18 521    111,9% 18 521     111,9%
with early retirement 16 078   21 947     160         10 974    68,3% 17 384    108,1% 17 384     108,1%
inactivity compensated by OIPH 17 956   25 157     176         12 579    70,1% 19 082    106,3% 19 082     106,3%
     (with activity after 60)** 17 956  25 157    176         14 088    78,5% 20 592    114,7% 20 592    114,7%
inactivity not compensated 17 956   25 157     156         12 579    70,1% 19 082    106,3% 19 082     106,3%
continuous, full-time 35 443   27 589     160         13 794    38,9% 21 636    61,0% 30 117     85,0%
with part-time 29 413   27 589     160         13 794    46,9% 21 051    71,6% 26 971     91,7%
with unemployment 33 094   27 469     160         13 734    41,5% 21 457    64,8% 28 833     87,1%
with early retirement 32 157   26 267     160         13 133    40,8% 21 107    65,6% 28 240     87,8%
inactivity compensated by OIPH 35 912   27 589     176         13 794    38,4% 21 586    60,1% 29 258     81,5%
     (with activity after 60)** 35 912  27 589    176         15 450    43,0% 23 242    64,7% 30 914    86,1%
inactivity not compensated 35 912   27 589     156         13 794    38,4% 21 586    60,1% 29 258     81,5%
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Sample cases with inactivity are supposed to be those of women with two children. 
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b) with two kinds of accidents: unemployment and inactivity 
continuous, full-time 11 885     15 617     160       7 808     65,7% 12 753   107,3% 12 753          107,3%
1 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 12 092     15 617     148       7 704     63,7% 12 480   103,2% 12 480          103,2%
1 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 12 162     15 617     156       7 808     64,2% 12 889   106,0% 12 889          106,0%
3 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 11 844     15 617     148       7 704     65,0% 12 451   105,1% 12 451          105,1%
3 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 11 901     15 617     156       7 808     65,6% 12 860   108,1% 12 860          108,1%
5 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 11 189     15 464     148       7 629     68,2% 12 205   109,1% 12 205          109,1%
5 y. unempl., 5 y. inact.+ 2 child. 11 206     15 464     156       7 732     69,0% 12 596   112,4% 12 596          112,4%
continuous, full-time 17 721     25 157     160       12 579   71,0% 19 045   107,5% 19 045          107,5%
1 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 18 141     25 157     148       12 411   68,4% 18 630   102,7% 18 630          102,7%
1 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 18 359     25 157     156       12 579   68,5% 19 191   104,5% 19 191          104,5%
3 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 17 853     25 157     148       12 411   69,5% 18 583   104,1% 18 583          104,1%
3 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 18 061     25 157     156       12 579   69,6% 19 143   106,0% 19 143          106,0%
5 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 16 869     24 624     148       12 148   72,0% 18 067   107,1% 18 067          107,1%
5 y. unempl., 5 y. inact.+ 2 child. 17 016     24 624     156       12 312   72,4% 18 597   109,3% 18 597          109,3%
continuous, full-time 35 443     27 589     160       13 794   38,9% 21 636   61,0% 30 117          85,0%
1 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 36 282     27 589     148       13 610   37,5% 21 062   58,0% 29 232          80,6%
1 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 36 718     27 589     156       13 794   37,6% 21 673   59,0% 29 548          80,5%
3 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 35 707     27 589     148       13 610   38,1% 21 044   58,9% 28 946          81,1%
3 y. unempl., 5 y. inact. + 2 child. 36 121     27 589     156       13 794   38,2% 21 657   60,0% 29 268          81,0%
5 y. unempl., 3 y. inact. 33 738     27 469     148       13 551   40,2% 20 842   61,8% 27 882          82,6%
5 y. unempl., 5 y. inact.+ 2 child. 34 033     27 469     156       13 734   40,4% 21 440   63,0% 28 186          82,8%
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